In his recent paper in the American Economic Review, Jensen (1997) argues that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. * We acknowledge with thanks support for this work provided through ESRC research grant L138251003 "Imperfect Financial Markets, Business Cycles, and Growth", which forms part of the programme on Understanding the Evolving Macroeconomy (UEM).
Introduction
In a paper published not so long ago in this journal, Henrik Jensen (1997) argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank does not improve the credibility of optimal monetary policy. He writes, "in fact, the chances of attaining credibility decrease" (his italics). He obtains this striking result from an analysis in which he assumes that the independence of the central bank is protected by re-appointment costs, which the government bears if it intervenes to alter the contract under which the central bank operates and thereby manipulates the central bank's policy actions at short notice. This result runs counter to many people's intuition about the effects of re-appointment costs. Most would imagine that such costs would protect a central bank from interference from elected politicians, and thereby enhance credibility. Jensen's result seems to substantiate Bennett McCallum's (1995 McCallum's ( , 1997 criticism that delegation does not solve the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, but merely relocates it.
In this comment we show that Jensen's result derives from an implicit limit on the range of policies that are considered. His analysis restricts the set of announced incentive schemes (or contracts) that the government might present to the central bank to maintain zero inflation. When this restriction is removed, the opposite result is restored; namely that costs of reappointing the central banker do in fact enable zero inflation to emerge as a credible policy in circumstances (i.e., when the government is sufficiently impatient) in which it would not do so in the absence of such costs.
The model
In this comment, we refer back extensively to Henrik Jensen's original article, and follow his notation. But for convenience, we repeat essential features of the model here. Jensen (1997) takes the widely used framework in which the economy's aggregate supply function is given by the standard expectationsaugmented Phillips curve
where the log of the natural level of output is normalised to zero; π t ,π e t are the actual and expected inflation rate respectively. The government's loss function combines squared deviations of inflation and output from their target levels. A term is added, when monetary policy is delegated to the central bank, to reflect the costs of re-appointing (or replacing) the central banker. The cost is proportional to the squared difference between the announced contract ( f a t ) and the realised contract (f t ). We follow Jensen's notation in denoting the loss function, when it is augmented by the term in re-appointment costs, by e L t rather than L t . Thus the government's loss function is
The central banker, to whom monetary policy is delegated, has the same (social) preferences over output and inflation as the government, but is subject to the contract which penalises the bank for creating inflation. The bank's loss function is
It shows that a penalty 2f t is imposed on the banker for each unit increase in the inflation rate.
In each period, four actions take place in sequence. At stage zero, the government delegates monetary policy to a central banker and announces a contract f a t . At stage one, the private sector forms expectations about inflation and sets wages. At stage two, the government sets actual conditions f t for monetary policy. Finally, at stage three, the central bank sets actual inflation.
Optimal Delegation
Jensen defines optimally delegated monetary policy as the policy in which the government imposes a contract f t = f opt = λαy * on the central bank. has an incentive to deviate from carrying it out, instead replacing it with a weaker contract.
Jensen considers whether the credibility of optimal policy can be established in the inifinitely repeated game, if the private sector reverts for one period to the discretionary solution following a deviation from optimal policy.
He shows that, in the absence of delegation (that is, when ϕ = 0 and f t = 0, and the bank and the government are one and the same agent), if the discount factor, β, exceeds a critical value ( b β ≡ 1/Λ, with Λ ≡ 1+λα 2 ) optimal monetary policy is a perfect Nash equilibrium and therefore is credible.
Does delegation allow optimal inflation to be achieved at lower discount factors? Jensen considers the following strategy combinations. If inflation turned out as expected in the previous play of the game, then the government announces and also eventually implements the optimal contract If the government were to deviate, having announced optimal delegation, it would choose f t so as to minimise its loss function, subject to π 
and this leads to a critical value for β, b β D (ϕ), which, Jensen shows, is:
It is clear, as Jensen proves, that the critical discount factor is greater when policy is delegated than when the government carries out monetary policy directly. The higher the re-appointment costs (ϕ), the higher the critical
The reason is that, although both the punishment subsequent to deviation and the gain from deviating become weaker the higher the reappointment costs (ϕ), the gain from deviating decreases by less than does the punishment.
Wider set of policy choices
An implicit restriction in Jensen's analysis is that in the case of optimal delegation, both the announced and the actual central bank contract are set at the optimal level λαy * . However, there is no reason why they should be the same. Any credible policy regime in which the actual contract is λαy * will deliver zero inflation. If the government were to announce a tougher contract, the incentive to deviate from the optimal contract would be reduced, and this fact may enable the policy to be credible with a lower discount factor. In this section we consider this possibility.
Consider the following strategies. In each period when it plays the reputational strategy (that is, when it is following its commitment policy), the government announces a "tough" contract for the central bank f a t = ω, with ω ≥ λαy * . People expect inflation of zero (π e t = 0). The government then actually implements the optimal contract with f t = λαy * . With this contract in place, the central bank duly delivers inflation of the expected rate π t = 0.
When the government cheats (deviates from the commitment policy), it announces the same contract as in the commitment policy, that is f a t = ω, and people respond by expecting zero inflation (π e t = 0), but then the government implements a different contract. In fact it behaves in a discretionary way, and implements the contract that minimizes its expected loss for this period, given the announced contract and the public's expectations of inflation. The government therefore implements f t = ω ϕΛ 1+ϕΛ
(following Jensen's equation 7) and the central bank delivers inflation
Following a period in which the government has deviated, it is punished.
In this play of the game, the government follows the discretionary policy, as set out in Jensen (1997) , equation 10, and reproduced in Section 3 above.
The payoffs to the government of two of the scenarios set out abovecommitment and deviation -depend on the value of the announced contract parameter ω. The payoffs under the three different scenarios are as follows:
In the proposed equilibrium, with the government following the precommitted strategy, its loss is
The government's loss on deviating from the pre-commitment strategy is
And when the private sector and government follow the discretionary strategy, the government's loss is
In order for the proposed solution to be sustainable with one-period punishment by reversion to discretion, we need to have
How do these payoffs change as ω is varied? Figure 1 plots them as func- (6)) is at a minimum. The loss for deviation (L DD t (ω)) is increasing in ω, but it is less than the loss under commitment when ω = λαy * . Thus as ω is increased above λαy * the temptation to cheat,
The loss under discretion, which is the loss in the punishment phase of the game,L NCD t+1 , is independent of ω. Therefore the punishment for cheating,
(ω)´, also diminishes as ω is increased above λαy * , but it does so slowly at first, sinceL P R t+1 (ω) is locally constant. So a small increase in the value of ω above λαy * is likely to make the commitment outcome sustainable with a lower discount factor.
It is possible to find the value of the announcement ω for which the critical value of β needed to sustain the reputational solution is at a minimum. From (9) it is clear that the critical value of β satisfies
With some algebraic manipulation, this critical value can be expressed as
in which ω
.
We want to choose ω (equivalently ω 0 ) to minimize the critical value.
This implies a value of ω 0 that lies in the range (0, B). The value of ω 0 that minimizes β critical is
and the value of β critical at its minimum point is
Since this value for b β D *
is less than 1/Λ, this result proves that the critical value of β under delegation, when any announcement is allowed for, is less than under simple discretion.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2 , in which the function (10) is plotted against ω 0 . It shows that at ω 0 = 0 (that is at ω = λαy * ), the critical value of the discount factor equals b β To give some indication of the quantitative significance of the results, Table 1 offers a numerical example. Four parameters determine the size of the effects: λ, α, y * , and ϕ. We set the weight on output stabilization λ equal to 1, the same as the weight on inflation stabilization in the objective functions (2) and (3); for the slope of the aggregate supply function (1) we use α = 0.4 so a 10% increase in surprise inflation induces a 4% increase in aggregate output; and for the target level of aggregate income we use y * = 0.05, indicating that the target is 5% above the natural level. The size of the reappointment cost parameter ϕ is harder to tie down, so we report results for a range of values. The table shows that optimal delegation as derived in this paper yields a significant reduction in the lowest discount needed to sustain zero inflation relative to that required when there is no delegation. When the re-appointment cost parameter is set at ϕ = 0.5, Jensen's analysis finds that a discount factor of 0.913 is needed; with no delegation the lowest discount factor is 0.862; and when the optimal contracts are used, without restriction on the announced contract, the lowest discount factor, our b β D * , equals 0.772. This shows that there is a significant effect of loosening Jensen's restriction on announced incentive schemes.
Conclusion
This comment has shown that if the government is allowed to make any announcement of the central bank's inflation contract ω then it is possible to have zero inflation using delegation with a lower discount factor than is needed to sustain zero inflation with no delegation of policy.
It may be argued that this result is merely a curiosity, because it involves the government in making an announcement about ω that is not honoured.
The actual value of the inflation penalty in the central bank's contract is always less than the announced value. This behaviour is expected, and the private sector expects and gets zero inflation -so they are happy. Arguably this scenario does not correspond with the behaviour of any government and central bank in practice.
A counter-argument to such a position is that the scenario presented above is analogous to Svensson's (1997) suggestion that optimal inflation and output stabilization might be achieved by giving the central bank a target for inflation that is lower than society's target -knowing all the while that discretionary behaviour by the central bank will lead to its generating society's target inflation rate on average. Alternatively, as Svensson (1997) explains, the inflation bias may be more simply removed by delegating to the central bank an output target equal to the economy's natural output level, instead of introducing either an inflation contract or a lower inflation target.
Like Jensen (1997) , the analysis in our paper relies on the assumption that delegation is imperfect. Having delegated policy, the government can intervene and, at some cost, change the inflation contract after expectations have been formed but before inflation is realized. In the case that changing the contract ex post takes longer than the lag between expectations formation and inflation realization, or that the cost (ϕ) of such a change is infinitely high, then delegation is completely successful.
The key point that we would stress here is the logical one that Jensen's result is based on an implicit assumption that may be too strong. When that assumption is relaxed, it is possible, by the government's appropriate choice of contracts for the central bank, to sustain zero inflation with delegated monetary policy when the discount factor is too low to sustain it in the absence of delegation. The column labelled b β gives the lowest discount factor for which zero inflation can be sustained using Jensen's proposed scheme of delegation; column 1/Λ gives the lowest discount factor when policy is not delegated (or ϕ = 0); and
gives the lowest discount factor when the optimal announced and implemented contracts are used. When the government plays the reputational strategy (that is, when it is following its commitment policy), the government announces a conrtact f a t = ω, with ω ≥ λαy * . People expect inflation of zero (π e t = 0). The government then actually implements the contract f t = λαy * , i.e., the actual penalty on the central bank for creating inflation is less than the pre-announced one. It is in fact equal to the penalty that induces the central bank to deliver zero inflation. With this scheme in place, the central bank duly delivers inflation of the expected rate π t = 0. The government's loss is thereforẽ
When the government cheats (deviates from the commitment policy), it announces the same contract as in the commitment policy, that is f a t = ω, and people respond by expecting zero inflation (π e t = 0), but then the government implements a different contract than it announced. It implements the contract that minimizes its expected loss for this period, given the announced contract and the public's expectations of inflation. The best scheme to implement satisfies Jensen's equation 7. The government therefore implements
and the central bank delivers inflation
The government's loss when it cheats is thereforẽ
In the punishment phase of the game, the government plays the discretionary policy. The government announces an incentive scheme f
, people expect inflation π e t = λαy * − f a,NCD t ϕΛ ϕΛ+1
, the actual incentive scheme is f t = f a,NCD t ϕΛ ϕΛ+1
, and actual inflation turns out as expected. The government's losses are theñ
The critical value of the discount factor β satisfies
The numerator of this expression can be written as
which with a little manipulation becomes .
We want to choose ω to minimize the critical value. We are looking at values of ω 0 that lie in the range (0, B). That is equivalent to looking at values of ω that are at least as great as in the Jensen solution and which go up to the value at which the punishment for cheating becomes zero, i.e., where the loss due to discretion equals the loss under reputation. At the mimimum critical value, .
Since this value is less than 1/Λ this proves that the critical β under delegation with any announcement is less than under simple discretion.
